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Deep brain stimulation (DBS) offers the 
potential to relieve some symptoms of 
movement disorders such as Parkinson’s 
disease and dystonia. Recently, the appli-
cations of DBS have been extended to 
treatment-resistant mental health prob-
lems such as depression (Rabins et al., 
2009). The successful application of DBS 
requires stimulation settings to be individ-
ually adjusted and the process of finding 
optimal settings can be lengthy. But what 
exactly are optimal settings?
Consider a hypothetical case of Philip, a 
34-year-old patient with a history of severe 
depression who undergoes a successful 
implantation of stimulation electrodes. 
Depending on the parameters of stimula-
tion, Philip is not clinically depressed but 
his symptoms drop only to a sub-clinical 
level (setting 1), he reaches an average level 
of well-being (setting 2), becomes very 
cheerful and energetic and takes advantage 
of it, trying to, as he says, “make up for the 
lost time” (setting 3), feels even better but 
a frequent ecstatic state makes him appear 
to misjudge some situations and he seems 
to have an incomplete awareness that he 
may be doing so (setting 4), becomes manic 
to the extent that he is rendered legally 
incompetent to make treatment decisions 
(setting 5).
There have been attempts to construct 
the concepts of disability and disease as a 
deviation from normal or species-typical 
functioning (e.g., Sabin and Daniels, 1994). 
If health is understood as an absence of 
disease and the goal of a medical interven-
tion is to promote health thus defined, a 
transition from a diseased state to either 
a sub-clinical (setting 1) or average state 
of well-being (setting 2) achieves the goal 
equally well. However, the “ normality 
view” faces well-known problems and 
the treatment/enhancement distinction 
is itself problematic enough not to serve 
as a good normative guide (Harris, 2007; 
Synofzik, 2009). It is unlikely that medical 
professionals would be satisfied by merely 
bringing a patient to a sub-clinical state if 
there is a more effective (after accounting 
for side-effects) intervention available. And 
for good reason – at the heart of medical 
intervention is the concern for the patient’s 
well-being. The effectiveness of DBS for 
reducing the symptoms as assessed by clini-
cal rating scales is admittedly important, but 
as Synofzik and Schlaepfer (2008) correctly 
point out, those improvements have to 
translate into the patient’s improved ability 
to pursue and achieve their personal goals 
– goals that are connected to the patient’s 
conception of a good life.
Some consider changes in personality to 
be among the risks of the DBS procedure 
(Glannon, 2009). This criticism is prob-
lematic even in the case of treatment for 
movement disorders, as not all side-effects 
are necessarily unwanted or undesirable, 
but becomes inapplicable when looking at 
treatment for neuropsychiatric conditions, 
since the goal of the intervention is exactly 
to change some cognitive and affective 
aspects of personality. Also, the aim of the 
treatment is not necessarily to rediscover the 
“real” patient hidden under the symptoms 
of a disorder. Rather, its aim is to improve 
patients’ quality of life, given their own idea 
of what that means. Consequently, legally 
competent patients are not obliged to live 
up to or agree with the ideas of authenticity 
or rationality held by their doctors.
Medical professionals may be hesitant 
to utilize their skills for what they see as 
enhancement, but this apparent presump-
tion against enhancement seems to be 
unjustified. Although we may have good 
reasons to prioritize interventions that 
improve the lives of those with generally 
worse health, medical professionals justi-
fiably also use their expertise for medical 
interventions that have little to do with 
restoring health. The obvious examples 
of socially valued enhancements provided 
by medical professionals are vaccinations 
(Harris, 2007) and contraception – the goal 
of the former is to enhance the immune sys-
tem, while that of the latter is to disrupt 
the reproductive function, which in turn 
enhances people’s control over their lives. 
Medical professionals also perform inter-
ventions that are of no medical benefit to 
the subjects of the intervention (for exam-
ple, blood donation or live organ donation). 
Thus, there is nothing in principle wrong 
with doctors using their expertise to provide 
an enhancing intervention other than treat-
ment. The questions we should be asking 
instead are about appropriate consent pro-
cedures, issues of prioritization, some ethi-
cal quandaries arising from the application 
of DBS and the limits of legitimate power 
of the physician in the setting characterized 
by high power inequalities, exacerbated by 
the fact that a patient cannot simply go to 
a different health care provider.
Currently, the medical professional may 
say “we can provide you with the possibility 
of leading a good life, but not with what 
you think is necessary for a very good life.” 
However, the presumption should surely 
be to provide the benefit that the patient 
seeks, and so the burden of giving reasons 
against this course of action rests on those 
who would deny this potential benefit. 
Legitimate concerns such as those related 
to limited financial resources (which could 
be offset if the patient is willing to pay for 
extra services) or the time constraints of the 
limited number of DBS specialists have to 
be weighed against other good moral rea-
sons to perform the enhancing procedure. 
Some of the variables in this moral calculus 
may be different in the case of enhancement 
for non-patients (for example, we have to 
add a costly and invasive surgical proce-
dure and follow-up), but the principle is 
the same. Since DBS practitioners are most 
commonly also researchers and members of 
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implications of neurotechnologies. Among 
others, it restates old questions about the 
role and purpose of the medical profession 
and the role that doctors should play in 
managing access to medical technologies: 
those that aim at alleviating suffering and 
those that more generally promote well-
being. At present, a limited number of spe-
cialists have control over the application 
of DBS. With this power, however, comes 
responsibility. Given that the ethics of the 
neuroenhancing application of DBS is less 
straightforward than it might have appeared 
at first sight, this responsibility includes, at 
the very least, a careful ethical assessment of 
requests for DBS for non-clinical use.
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many the benefits are too uncertain and the 
invasiveness of the procedure and associated 
risks and inconveniences too discouraging to 
even entertain the possibility of undergoing 
DBS. Those few that want to undergo DBS 
may do it for reasons that include, but are 
not limited to, the expectation of benefits. 
When the expectation of benefits is the main 
reason, this may be due to misunderstanding 
about effectiveness and risks of the procedure; 
this can be however addressed by providing 
appropriate information and the role of the 
specialist is of a crucial importance. Potential 
subjects do not have the obligation to “argue 
their case” or convince the physician, but 
they need to display sufficient awareness of 
the risks and benefits so that the requirements 
of informed consent are met.
However, there may also be those who 
are aware of the risks and the speculative 
nature of benefits but still want to undergo 
the procedure (e.g., for various reasons to 
do with pushing the boundaries of science 
and medicine). What should be done in 
such cases? Synofzik (2009) suggest that 
there may be cases where predicted risks 
outweigh predicted benefits, in which a 
physician has a good reason to discour-
age the use of an intervention on medical 
grounds but may still have a good moral 
reason to provide it; and to do so on the 
basis of subjects’ widely constructed interest 
and the respect for their autonomy. So there 
may be cases, when despite medical risks 
outweighing the benefits (including cases 
where risks are possible to estimate with a 
higher degree of certainty than benefits) 
it may be ethically permissible to provide 
DBS solely on the basis of considering the 
subject’s interests, albeit interests that go 
beyond the simply medical. This first step 
of the assessment will likely be followed by 
considering reasons for and against the pro-
cedure independent of the first step (fund-
ing, the potential to gain knowledge that 
could be transferred to the clinical setting, 
progress of science, etc.).
We may understand the sentiment of 
doctors who want to focus on relieving 
suffering, but we have to remember that 
the treatment/enhancement distinction 
that seems so obvious and apparent in the 
medical setting is much more difficult to 
construct as an ethically relevant one. The 
prospect of non-therapeutic use of DBS, 
and neuroenhancement in general, raises 
important questions about the societal 
the scientific community, good reasons in 
favor of the procedure include, for example, 
the gains in scientific and medical knowl-
edge about DBS and the brain. If DBS can 
bring benefit, there have to be really good 
reasons to deny it.
Although the use of DBS in non-clinical 
populations is not intrinsically unethical, 
this scenario seems, at least prima facie, to 
differ from the clinical uses of DBS in the 
predicted benefit to the subject and the 
acceptability of risks. Let us have a closer 
look. In relation to the use of psychop-
harmacological agents in non-therapeutic 
context, Synofzik (2009) proposed that the 
ethically justified decision of whether to 
provide and/or recommend a potentially 
enhancing agent should rest on the assess-
ment of predicted risks and benefits and 
the respect for autonomy of the subject. His 
approach has the advantage of accounting 
not only for the moral weight of the pre-
dicted benefits of an intervention (espe-
cially when benefits outweigh the risks), but 
also for the fact that we often (and justifiably 
so) do what is not in our medical interest or 
otherwise narrowly construed self-interest 
in order to live according to our values – and 
for the importance of respecting choices 
of those with the capacity to make them, 
even if we find them surprising or difficult 
to explain.
Synofzik and Schlaepfer (2008) argued 
that although there is nothing in princi-
ple wrong with DBS for enhancement in 
non-clinical subjects, DBS is not ready for 
non-therapeutic application. They point 
out, for example, that there are no sys-
tematic studies of DBS effectiveness with 
non-clinical populations, making the evi-
dence-based benefit assessment difficult. 
However, although there have been reports 
of at least one patient who chooses a setting 
depending on how she wants to feel (Russo, 
2007), there also are no systematic studies of 
an non-therapeutic use of DBS for clinical 
populations – but this fact need not be a 
definitive argument against the permissibil-
ity of using DBS in those cases. What seems 
crucial here is rather the fact that the risks 
associated with surgery have already been 
taken, and so the risk/benefit ratio is more 
favorable in those cases – in other words, 
“trying it out” seems to be not as risky.
It is worth noting that at present it is highly 
unlikely that the public will queue to undergo 
DBS for non-therapeutic purposes – for 
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